Turkey's activism in Africa has been extensively noted. It has been argued that non-state actors like business and civil society organizations take part in Turkeys Africa initiative. Nevertheless, state/non-state interaction in Turkey's foreign policy implementation has not been accounted for in theoretical terms in Turkish foreign policy literature. This paper combines post-international theory and foreign policy implementation in looking at Turkey's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that adapting to the multi-centric world, the Turkish government has moved beyond conventional state-to-state dealings in implementing its foreign policy and increasingly relies on the cooperation of non-state actors.
Introduction
T h e concept of foreign policy h a s traditionally b e e n u n d e r s t o o d in statecentric t e r m s a n d h a s b e e n e q u a t e d t o actions a n d decisions by official decision m a k e r s .
1 W i t h t h e advent of globalization, t h e s t a t e -c e n t r i s m z O n the other hand, non-state actors' participation in foreign policy j can also be analyzed in terms of their interaction with the formal state actors and agencies involved in the implementation process, where nonstate actors take on operational responsibilities. There is a growing empirical literature about how formal foreign policy makers rely on and work with non-state actors in implementing foreign policy. Issues range from hiring private security companies to wage war to hiring private consultants to promote democracy abroad. In some cases, involvement of non-state actors has been so overwhelming that formal policy makers have been unable to implement a strategic framework due to "ad hoc and incoherent proliferation of actors and policy perspectives."
With respect to Turkey's foreign policy towards Africa, there has been a similar focus on decision making to explain why the Turkish government has decided to intensify its relations with African states. This literature, although small, generally explains the interest of the Turkish government in sub-Saharan Africa with reference to globalization and its E U membership process and the ensuing domestic pressure either from business groups to diversify their export markets or from peripheral "religious and nationalistic groups" to take action more independently from Western institutions. 11 With respect to Africa, it has been argued that the Turkish government relies on "Turkish people's kinship to fellow Muslims." Another explanation focuses on formal policy makers' perceptions and the introduction of a new vision for a multidimensional foreign policy. More often than not, the significant involvement of £ non-state actors in Turkeys opening to Africa is highlighted, and it is = > argued that there is a "smooth convergence of both governmental and * business policies." 14 2 Nevertheless, the involvement of non-state actors is often portrayed p in the form of foreign policy output, e.g., the level of trade, or the amount £ of developmental and humanitarian aid from civil society.
1 Such stud-2 ies usually lack a comprehensive theoretical framework to conceptually 3 account for the interaction patterns among different actors involved in z the implementation of Turkish Foreign Policy on sub-Saharan Africa.
An implementation perspective, which explicates how Turkey has implemented its decision to open up to Africa, may lead to a conceptually informed discussion of the nature of the relationship between non-state actors and the government during the implementation process. This article builds upon and integrates two theoretical approaches which have been developed independently from each other and have rarely been brought together: a foreign policy implementation approach and post-internationalism. Looking from a post-international perspective, we argue that there is "an apparent trend in which more and more of the interactions that sustain world politics unfold without the direct involvement of nations and states." 16 In this multi-centered world, the ultimate resort for realizing goals has become the withholding of cooperation or compliance rather than military force. Implementation studies also posit that foreign policy is implemented by coalitions, which have to be maintained over time. 18 Accordingly, Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa has been implemented with varying degrees and types of cooperation with non-state entities in a multitude of spheres. W e differentiate these interactions into three categories: Cooperative, complementary and supplementary.
T h e article consists of four parts. In the following part, we provide a brief history of Turkey's relations with sub-Saharan African countries. m Most of these interactions were state-centric with minimal involvement •» m from sovereignty-free actors (SFAs). In the second part, we provide a £ more detailed account of what implementation studies and post-interna-n tionalism can offer for the study of foreign policy in general and Turkey's < sub-Saharan African foreign policy in particular. In the third part, we £ analyze four patterns of interaction between sovereignty-bound actors * (SBAs) and SFAs in the implementation of Turkish foreign policy to-» ward sub-Saharan Africa; cooperative, complementary, supplementary, < and conflictual. Lastly, we conclude with some comments about Turkey's prospects in sub-Saharan Africa in light of these interaction patterns.
Sub-Saharan Africa in Turkish foreign policy: A history
During the Second World War and the Cold War, international circumstances and Turkey's domestic social, economic, and political problems limited Turkey's outreach to non-Western societies. 19 Nonetheless, Turkish foreign policy did witness brief attempts at a more proactive and multidimensional foreign policy and relative increases in Turkey's relations with sub-Saharan Africa. Since the Cold War, along with the newly independent states of Former Soviet Union and the Middle Eastern countries, Africa has emerged as a new focus of interest for Turkish foreign policy. Until the end of the Second World War, Turkey's relations with sub-Saharan Africa were based on establishing limited diplomatic contacts. Even though the anti-imperialistic character of the Turkish War of Liberation had triggered sympathetic longings for independence in sub-Saharan African communities, bilateral relations with sub-Saharan Africa could not move beyond that point. In this period, Ethiopia was the first and only sub-Saharan African state in which Turkey opened an embassy. 21 Turkey's membership of the United Nations ( U N ) in 1946 and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ( N A T O ) in 1952 were key events with respect to its relations with African countries. Turkey's pro-British stance in Cyprus and the Suez Crisis and its disbelief in the effectiveness of neutrality in the face of Soviet expansionism, led to diplomatic tensions between Turkey and the African states of the N o nAligned Movement. T h e pro-Western attitude Turkey displayed in the 1955 Bandung Conference caused further tension between the sides. However, lack of personnel in the MFA led to the abandonment of the Action Plan. Economic and political difficulties after 1980 military coup led Turkey to close its Ghana Embassy in 1981. However, there were a few more attempts to boost relations with sub-Saharan Africa. In January 1982, President of Sudan Mohammed Nimeyri visited Turkey. That same year, Turkey's first graduate program on African Studies opened at Gazi University, and Turkey also signed a T E T agreement with Somalia. By the mid-1980s, with the impact of economic liberalization and Turkish Prime Minister Ozal's strong convictions about liberal economic development and foreign policy, "activism" and "multi-faceted" foreign policy was once again on the agenda. While Turkey's rapid economic liberalization estranged a few sub-Saharan countries, 32 official economic agencies like the State Planning Organization ( S P O ) and the Treasury became assets in Turkey's new foreign policy implementation mechanism. In 1985, the S P O started Turkey's first official development program, amounting to $10 million to be used for institutional capacity building in several sub-Saharan African countries. 33 Turkey also signed cooperation and T E T agreements with seven other African countries.
34
Turkey's foreign policy activism and multi-dimensionalism in the post-Cold War milieu was based on an understanding that Turkey's future with the West would rely on its relations with the non-West. Accordingly, the Ozal administration signed more international agreements with the non-West than any other previous administration in Turkish history.
35 W i t h respect to sub-Saharan Africa, Turkey continued to sign cooperation agreements on health, security, and culture. 
Post-international implementation of foreign policy
Any study of implementation requires the researcher to look beyond the official decision makers and focus on the "context" or "environment" in which foreign policy is made. 44 Categorically, the environment consists of implementers, i.e. government agencies and (domestic or transnational) non-state actors on the one hand and targets of foreign policy, whose beliefs and behaviors are sought to be changed. 4 In implementation studies, context is not considered as an exogenous factor against which actors are rendered powerless. Rather, it is defined as "other actors and the set of relations which they entertain." 46 In the age of globalization and heightened interconnectedness, foreign policy is no longer solely a domain of state activity and increasingly involves non-state actors. Therefore, looking at the implementation of foreign policy requires a relational approach, embedded in a globalization perspective. An implementation approach looks at pairs or multiplicities of actors-both implementers and targets-in terms of their interaction and the changes in their level and type of interaction over time. As opposed to the hierarchical nature of the decision-making process, implementation is based on coalitions. 47 A decision is properly implemented only when at least some of the actors and agencies involved have a consensual relationship over a specific action to be taken, even if they do not agree on the final goal of the overall foreign policy. £ major actors in the implementation. Today's polycentric world is com-= posed of actors who are sovereignty bound (SBAs) and sovereignty free z (SFAs). According to Rosenau, SFAs are polities which operate in ac-« cordance with their capability to initiate and sustain actions rather than p by their legal status or sovereignty, whereas SBAs rely on their formal £ legal status and/or sovereignty. 48 Although they are formally bound by 2 the legal authority of states, the SFAs of the multi-centric world are able ^ to evade the constraints of states and pursue their own goals. 49 Accordz ingly, in a fully evolved multi-centric world, SFAs and SBAs enjoy relative equality as far as initiating action is concerned. Nevertheless, both SBAs and SFAs require a form of cooperation with each other, maintained over time, to implement their policies. 50 As an adaptation mechanism to globalization, states are increasingly relying on cooperation with non-state actors. 51 As governmental policies become more ambitious, relations between state and non-state actors become ever more crucial in implementing those policies.
Central to both post-internationalism and an implementation approach is a focus on the presence or lack of cooperative behavior between SFAs and SBAs. Unlike in a state-centric world, in a multicentric world, the mode of such collaboration is temporary coalitions. Both approaches also take sequences of interactions as the units around which their empirical inquiries are organized. 53 While rules governing interactions among actors are situational and mostly ad hoc, some general patterns do emerge over repeated sequences of interactions. These patterns are most evident in the degree of control over foreign policy outcomes and the spheres of co-operative action. In the initial phase, SBAs have full control over the implementation process. This is due to the limited involvement of SFAs and the focusing of policies on spheres of action which are the exclusive domain of SBAs. Examples include signing international agreements, taking part in intergovernmental organizations, or providing troops for peacekeeping operations. In a fully evolved relationship, SFAs gain more autonomy and spheres of action expand to include areas such as humanitarian assistance and academic, professional, or cultural exchanges. As a result, control over foreign pol- icy outcomes become more diffuse. 54 Implementation studies show that decision makers can influence outcomes by becoming more involved in the implementation process through "horizontally structured intermediate organizations" ( H S I O s ) . From a post-international perspective, these organizations are SBAs which are specifically designed to work with SFAs, have an extensive network through their branches inside and outside the country, and receive donations from individuals and private organizations. Most governmental aid and rescue agencies occupy this middle ground.
Based on the above arguments, it is possible to discern four categories of interaction that change in terms of the actors involved, governmental control over outcomes, spheres of action, and timing. T h e first category comprises cooperative interaction between SFAs and SBAs. Cooperative interaction occurs when SBAs and SFAs directly cooperate in order to achieve a common goal. Although underlying motivations may change for each actor, their actions are congruent, i.e., they are in agreement about what needs to be done. In most cases, there is substantive SBA involvement, and governmental control over outcomes is high. Since it requires high SFA compliance, the common purpose of interaction is highlighted and joint SBA-SFA projects are frequent. Spheres of action are mostly humanitarian: poverty alleviation, development, education and health improvements, etc. Cooperative interaction mostly takes place in the initial stages of engagement between SBAs and SFAs. T h e second category is complementary interaction. In complementary interaction, SBAs and SFAs have different goals. This interaction type requires more involvement by SFAs as well as H S I O s . They do not actually work on the same project, but coordinate their activities. T h e spheres of action mostly comprise trade and investment and transportation. There is only moderate SBA involvement and governmental control over outcomes, which last is mostly achieved through H S I O s . T h e third category is supplementary interaction, where SFAs take on most of the responsibilities. There is minimal SBA involvement and control over outcomes. There may also be partial H S I O involvement, especially in the coordination of activities. The spheres of action are providing humanitarian/developmental aid, establishing mechanisms of intercultural exchange, as well as promoting private interests. T h e level of supplementary interactions 54 Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, 250. 55 Smith and Clarke, "Foreign Policy Implementation, " 7. 56 The categories are adaptations of a similar categorization by Cohen and Kupcu, "Privatizing Foreign Policy," 41: direct engagement between states and non-state actors; selective engagement, or episodic burden sharing; NSAs circumventing states; conflictual relations; and agenda setting.
£ increases in the later sequences of action, as SFAs gain more experience = > and expand their networks. z O n the other hand, SBAs and SFAs do not always see eye to eye on 2 all foreign policy matters. H u m a n rights groups, environmentalists, and p business circles pose certain challenges to the formal foreign policies of £ states. These not only take the form of discursive actions, but also inj; volve foreign policy behaviors which are not in line with the official posis tion of states. Moreover, as noted earlier, SFAs may also impede SBAs' z efforts to achieve their foreign policy goals by simply refusing to participate in foreign policy implementation. This form of conflictual interaction occurs when SFAs and SBAs challenge each other's foreign policy goals in fundamental ways. Spheres of contention include human rights and democracy. Either SFAs or SBAs may ultimately prevail, depending on the resources they allocate to the issue, and the domestic and/or international support they receive.
Post-international implementation of Turkey's sub-Saharan Africa policy a. Cooperative interaction:
Cooperative interaction between SFAs and SBAs consists of implementation phases during which the Turkish government and non-state organizations directly cooperate in order to achieve common goals. W i t h respect to Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa, the A K P government's goals of establishing new connections with African countries and creating new export markets correspond to the needs of small and medium-sized Anatolian businesses and faith-based Turkish N G O s endeavors to recreate links with Muslim communities in Africa. T h e collaboration is based on a convergence of goals that arise from different motivations. Whereas secular N G O s or government agencies employ a rights-based language in their actions, faith-based N G O s utilize the language of religious duty and obligation when explaining their involvement. 5 8 For example, the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency ( T I K A ) provides water and sanitation services as a contribution to African countries' development by preventing deaths from water-borne diseases, decreasing the daily burden of carrying water, and hence increasing the life quality of the people. as cleanliness is seen as a religious duty, especially in Muslim purifica-m tion rituals (abdest). Similarly, for the Turkish Red Crescent, food-aid f programs are part of the organization's official mission to provide health 5 to those in need. For Muslim N G O s , it is imperative that every Mus-™ lim share his/her fortune with the poor by donating money for animal < sacrifices around the world. Therefore, although government agencies' £ missions are secular and Muslim N G O s are religiously inspired, there is * a high degree of de facto convergence between their activities. £ T h e spheres of action where most cooperative interaction takes place ™ are consultation, humanitarian aid, and development. In most cases, there is substantive governmental involvement in terms of initiative, funding and coordination. Accordingly, governmental control over outcomes is high. Since cooperative interaction requires high compliance by SFAs, the common purpose of interaction is highlighted and joint SBA-SFA projects are frequent. These actions involve international meetings about sub-Saharan Africa, development and health promotion services in sub-Saharan Africa, and the education of students from sub-Saharan Africa. Accordingly, crisis-stricken countries which need the above services, such as Sudan and Somalia, become foreign policy targets in which cooperative engagement between SBAs and SFAs is most visible.
To establish consultative mechanisms, the Turkish government began an initiative to address the problems in Somalia by organizing two international conferences in May 2010 and on May 31-June 1 2012. Even though the funding and logistics for these conferences were provided by the Turkish MFA, the international private sector, civil society, women's groups, youth, and the Somalian diaspora were all encouraged to discuss how a stable peace could be brought to Somalia. 59 T h e significance of SFA involvement was highlighted in the final declarations of the two conferences. In May 2011, Turkey also hosted the 4 t h United Nations Conference on the Least Developing Countries conference; again with the participation of Turkish and African business groups and civil society organizations. Over 400 participants from civil society took part in discussions. 62 T h e final declaration expressed the need £ for further association between private sector and political elites to pro-= > vide development for the least developed countries. 63 In May 2012, the T h e Turkish government also cooperates with SFAs to provide development aid and health promotion services in sub-Saharan Africa. As the official aid agency of the Turkish government, T I K A operates as the intermediary organization. In 2001, T I K A was designated the sole coordinator of all Turkish development aid, which was previously allocated in an uncoordinated manner by various Turkish SBAs. £ ( S A M E D E R ) , 7 6 the Anatolian Support of Healthy Life Associa-= tion ( A N S E D E R ) , 7 7 and the Aegean Health Volunteers Association z ( E G E S A D E R ) . 7 8 These projects have provided free health checkups, 2 circumcisions, and cataract surgeries, as well as free medicines and medip cal supplies. In December 2012, the Deva Hospital was opened in So-£ malia through the cooperation between T I K A , the Aegean International al Health Federation (ESAFED), and the Turkish Ministry of Health.
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Moreover, these health programs also cover the education of Somalian z doctors and nurses by T I K A and ESAFED. 7 9 Furthermore, under its program to provide clean water, T l K A began to open water wells in Ethiopia with the cooperation of General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works (DSI). 
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granted Turkish government scholarships. In 2010-2011, 390 schol ships were granted to sub-Saharan African students. In its first instances, SFA-SBA engagement takes a cooperative form z because SFAs that are less experienced in transnational activities often need a SBA partner to introduce them to foreign countries and assist them in organizing their efforts internationally, as well as acquiring permissions from target countries. This has been especially true in health campaigns and water well projects in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, working in crisis situations requires effective security arrangements, which can only be provided by traditional interstate cooperation. In subsequent campaigns, the SFAs take more initiative, and begin to operate more independently, as has been the case with Turkish humanitarian N G O s in Africa.
ar-

b. Complementary interaction:
Complementary interaction involves SBAs and SFAs acting in coordination or loose cooperation but to achieve independent objectives. Most complementary engagement involves business and trade actors who act in line with official foreign policy objectives but with the open intention to make private gain. This kind of engagement benefits SBAs and SFAs in different ways. While pursuing their private interests, SFAs also gain access to host SBAs, influencing their future decisions and pressuring them to implement policies in due time and manner. 87 SBAs, on the other hand, benefit from private funding and legitimize their policies and increase their credibility in the eyes of target countries. In complementary interaction, governmental control over SFAs' actions is moderate to low. Examples include official visits with mixed delegations, international conferences, and the operations of Turkish Airlines ( T H Y ) in sub-Saharan Africa.
Regarding official visits to sub-Saharan Africa, complementary interaction involves mixed delegations composed of Turkish state authorities, private businessmen, academics, and artists. To promote bilateral diplo-87 Interview with Mehmet Akif Altan, the MUSiAD Bursa member, Ankara, January 10, 2013. Altan said that the primary consideration of businessmen participating in these international visits is to gain access to government officials to further their domestic business interests. An interest in doing business in sub-Saharan Africa usually develops after the visit. In subsequent visits, they convey their demands to government officials, such as proper implementation of trade agreements and increased speed of transactions.
matic relations, the Turkish government has been paying regular official visits to sub-Saharan African states. While the primary aim of these visits is to sign cooperation agreements in areas such as trade, transportation, visa regulations, health, and tourism, an increasing number of these visits have also been opened to participation by SFAs such as business leaders and artists. In this context, whereas state authorities meet with their counterparts, business leaders and artists accompanying the Turkish authorities on these visits follow their own agendas. Through special programs designed by Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEIK), business elites have been seeking ways to start, review, or develop their related investments in local markets. Academics may gain first-hand knowledge of Turkey s policies in sub-Saharan Africa, whereas artists increase their prestige and popularity as well as engage in humanitarian activities.
A It is possible to discern a similar pattern in Prime Minister Erdogan's visits to sub-Saharan Africa. In his visit to Somalia on August 19, 2011, he was accompanied by music artists Ajda Pekkan, Nihat Dogan, Sertab Erener and Muazzez Ersoy. This visit was unique since it was the first time the Turkish state's foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa sought to work with Turkish artists. This interaction has led to more independent actions by artists about Somalia: Erener and Pekkan both gave concerts, income from which was donated to Somalia, whereas £ Dogan declared that he would donate half the income he earned from = his subsequent album to Somalia. 92 O n his January 2013 visits to Gaz bon, Niger, and Senegal, Erdogan invited more than 300 business 2 leaders. It is reasonable to expect that these mixed-delegation visits will p continue as Turkey implements its decision to increase its trade volume £ with sub-Saharan Africa to $50 billion by 2015. and business groups meet to discuss the role of Turkey vis-a-vis the con-™ temporary problems of Africa. T h e first of these congresses was support--o ed by several SBAs, such as the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the 5 Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey ( T U B I T A K ) n and T I K A . 9 8 T h e later congresses, however, were organized without the < direct involvement of SBAs. In addition to these congresses, T A S A M £ organized a Turkey-Africa Civil Society Organization Forum in August * 2008, concurrently with the Turkey-Africa Cooperation Summit. This *> forum provided opportunities for SFAs to extend their network and ™ share ideas and experiences, leading to the establishment of the International Development and Cooperation Platform of Non-governmental Organizations ( U S T K l P ) . 9 9 T h e African operations of T H Y can also be categorized as complementary interaction between the Turkish government and non-state actors. As the private national airline company of Turkey, T H Y has been a strong actor in implementing Turkish foreign policy towards sub-Sahara Africa by starting direct flights to several regional cities since 2006. T I K A s extension of its activities to sub-Saharan Africa began in 2005, when it opened its first office in sub-Saharan Africa. Its activities are arranged in three specific development programs concerning agriculture, health, and professional training. These projects were initially implemented in cooperation with other SFAs such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture. Incrementally, Turkish and sub-Saharan African SFAs have begun to cooperate with T l K A in its projects. As their network and know-how have improved, these SFAs have initiated independent humanitarian and developmental projects. In other words, these supplementary activities are mostly spin-offs from cooperative or complementary interaction between SFAs and SBAs.
Before T l K A began its operations in sub-Saharan Africa, the activities of SFAs were ad hoc, single country emergency aid campaigns in the form of supplying food, clothing and medicine, mostly at times of crisis or religious holidays. In 2005, development aid from SFAs to sub-Saharan African countries amounted to $2 million. 106 In 2011, it rose to $120 million, making sub-Saharan Africa the focal point of all SFA aid. 107 Traditionally, these campaigns were organized by Diyanet Foundation, an organization which is directly linked to an SBA, the Moreover, the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and the Union of African Chamber of Commerce, Industry, and Agriculture Professions (UACCIAP) have met to strengthen cooperation and establish a Turkey-Africa Chamber. While the first four of these congresses were supported by SBAs, the latter three were more independent activities, with the participation and cooperation of several N G O s from African countries. 139 T h e issues covered have also become more diverse; while the first congresses concentrated more on intergovernmental relations and organizations, later congresses were more focused on issues related to Africa and inter-societal cooperation. Moreover, the last two congresses were organized in Sudan, and in Ghana. The Turkish education sector has not only accepted African students, £ but also reached out into sub-Saharan Africa by setting up private Turk-" ish nurseries, primary schools, colleges and, in one case, a university. 145 
<
Opened by private businessmen, these schools are usually referred to as £ part of Islamic Gulenist movement. 146 The earliest of these schools were * opened in countries where the Turkish government already had a pres-*> ence, such as Senegal, Tanzanya, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa. 14 ™ Nevertheless, a closer look at the years of opening of these schools shows that they were opened in three waves corresponding to Turkey's official declaration of interest in sub-Saharan Africa. T h e first wave begins in 1998, the year of the Opening Action Plan, when Turkish schools were opened in five new sub-Saharan African countries. and praise their quality of education.
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Although these schools are run £ by private entrepreneurs, Turkish officials give moral support to these = schools through visits during their stay in sub-Saharan Africa and sym-2 bolic support through attendance at their events. Such SBA support for 2 these schools might have accelerated their spread into the continent. 153 T h e Turkey-based H u m a n Rights Agenda Association and Amnesty International Turkey both condemned the invitation of al-Basheer to Turkey. Moreover, al-Basheer's visit to Turkey was harshly criticized by columnists in Turkish newspapers. T h e Turkish government declared that they had no intention of arresting al-Basheer. Under pressure from the international community, however, Turkish decision makers did decide to lower the profile of the subject, undertaking some "quiet diplomacy" 156 which culminated in al-A second example of conflictual interaction between SBAs and ™ SFAs can be observed with respect to Turkish foreign policy on Soma--D lia. O n July 27, 2013, the Turkish Embassy in Mogadishu was bombed 5 by the Al-Shabaab radical Islamist terrorist group, killing one Turkish " Special Forces officer and injuring three others. Al-Shabaab argued < that the Turkish government was intervening in Somalia's affairs and £ "bolstering] the apostate regime and attempting] to suppress the es-* tablishment of Islamic Shari'ah." T h e group also accused Turkish of-£ ficials of plotting against Somali people and "attacking] the home of ™ the Muslims."
157 T h e Turkish Parliament Speaker Cemil (Jicek argued that the attack was directly aimed at disrupting Turkey's humanitarian actions in Somalia, 158 while the Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag stated that Al Shabab could not stop Turkey's actions. Nevertheless, the attack led to increased security measures, which implies that Turkey's foreign policy implementation in Somali has become even more challenging. 159 From a theoretical point of view, the attack was important since it arose not between state and non-state actors in Turkey, but between the Turkish state and a Somalian non-state actor.
There are also instances where SBAs try to impede SFAs activities concerning Turkey's relations with sub-Saharan African countries and citizens. T h e academic journal Afrika published by A Q A U M was suspended by the Ankara University administration in early 2013, amid allegations of government pressure. 160 T h e third issue of the journal had been dedicated to Turkey's policy towards African immigrants and refugees. It has been argued that a case study criticizing Turkey's handling of Nigerian citizen Festus Okey's death in a police station was the catalyst for the administration's attempts to censor the journal and its subsequent suspension. In response, A Q A U M researchers protested the general inclination to see research centers as units existing to reproduce the views of the bureaucracy, arguing that academics should contend with those colleagues who operate within the confines of a bureaucratic £ mindset. Unlike in the first two cases, here it was the state actor that = intervened to impede the activities of the non-state actor. z T h e conflictual cases between state and non-state actors in Turkish o E foreign policy on sub-Saharan Africa have two implications: Controp versy over Al Basher and the Somalia attack show that Turkish opening £ up to sub-Saharan Africa has not been received positively by all and that 2 Turkish and African non-state actors are able to make it difficult for s Turkey to implement its foreign policy. T h e Afrika journal incident, on z the other hand, demonstrates that the government, relying on its legal and institutional prerogatives, can still impede the actions of non-state actors whenever these actions are deemed detrimental to the implementation of its sub-Saharan Africa foreign policy.
Conclusion
Despite an early call to redirect some of the attention from decision making to the implementation process where foreign policy is enacted, there are still few studies that focus on foreign policy implementation. 162 In this study, we attempted to redress this lack of emphasis by concentrating on Turkeys implementation of its sub-Saharan African foreign policy. Employing a post-international perspective, we analyzed the interaction of SBAs and SFAs in various spheres and observed that SFAs take on more responsibilities as the relations with the foreign policy target intensify. Apart from taking foreign policy decisions, SBAs set the rules by signing trade, visa, and transportation agreements with target actors, providing a suitable background for intensified relations. They also sometimes provide SFAs with public funds and expertise. Nevertheless, in the later phases of implementation, SFAs become more self-reliant and taken more initiative. Because of increased know-how and extended transnational networks, Turkish SFAs have become increasingly proactive, covering more elusive spheres like intercultural exchange. Such proactive and independent behavior seems to be a spin-off from previous experience in collaborative projects between SFAs and SBAs. T h e SFAs which had more experience in collaborating with the SBAs also became more active in taking initiative in the later periods compared to other SFAs with less collaborative experience.
O u r findings support the post-international argument that SFAs, with their non-hierarchical and less bureaucratic organization, are more adaptable to different circumstances and more efficient in utilizing new technologies, leading to an increase in their overall involvement in for-eign policy. Nevertheless, greater collaboration with SBAs increased « their access to target countries and helped them to broaden their range •= of activities. If the trend continues, it is reasonable to expect that Turk-5 ish SBAs will become more dependent on SFAs as the breadth of issues n covered and their efficiency and flexibility increase in the coming years. < O n the other hand, conflictual interactions are also more probable than £ ever as the consequences of Turkey's foreign policy in sub-Saharan Af-* rica become more visible and available to scrunity by wider domestic and » international publics. ™
